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ABSTRACT 
After India’s 1974 nuclear test publicly demonstrated the proliferation risks of nuclear assistance, the 
United States increased its efforts to prevent nuclear exports to sensitive states. It faced challenges 
from its West European allies, France and West Germany, who pursued their commercial and 
strategic interests through nuclear assistance to third-party states like Pakistan, Brazil, India, and 
others. Despite multilateral efforts like the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and bilateral 
negotiations with the supplier states’ governments, the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, 
only obtained partial success on the nonproliferation front vis-à-vis these supplier states. The United 
States was relatively more successful with respect to Paris through concluding quid pro quo bargains 
but it was less effective with Bonn, to whom it had few ‘carrots’ to offer. Using newly declassified 
archival documents, this research sheds new light on U.S. nonproliferation policy and transatlantic 
relations during the superpower détente.  
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“We would like it to appear that our policy in this area is independent even though it is coordinated 
with you…So if you are going to make a statement, we would like to know beforehand so we could 
issue something beforehand.” 
— Louis de Guiringaud to Henry Kissinger and President Ford, 1 October 1976 1 
 
 
“While insisting on the immutability of the agreement with Brazil, [Assistant Secretary Hans] 
Lautenschlager said something had to be done to meet the concerns expressed by President-elect 
Carter.” 
— U.S. Ambassador Walter Stoessel to Henry Kissinger, 23 December 19762 
 
 
 
 
“Kissinger’s brief visit to South Asia does not have the appearance of having accomplished anything 
of substance. If the intention was to dramatise his and Ford Administration’s preoccupation about 
nuclear proliferation, this was achieved to some extent since the media generously covered his Iran 
and Pakistan trips.” 
 
— Indian Embassy in Washington to Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 15 August 19763 
 
 
When the news of the Indian underground nuclear explosion reached Washington on 18 May 
1974, the reaction from the Nixon White House was remarkably subdued. Steeped in the 
Watergate scandal, the U.S. administration played down the significance of the Indian test. 
Yet, India’s nuclear test which it called a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ was a serious blow to 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that had entered into force only four years earlier 
in 1970. As a result, while the official U.S. reaction to New Delhi’s nuclear test was 																																																								
1  White House Memorandum of Conversation with President Ford, Louis de Guiringaud, Henry Kissinger, 
Brent Scowcroft and Jacques Koscuisko-Morizet, 1 October 1976, National Security Adviser’s Memoranda of 
Conversation, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter GRFL), 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553548.pdf, last accessed on 21 January 2018. 
2 Confidential telegram 21555 from the US Embassy in Bonn to the Secretary of State, NODIS, National 
Security Advisor Presidential Country Files For Europe and Canada, Country File: Germany - State Department 
telegrams (1), Box 7, folder State Department telegrams to SECSTATE-LIMIDIS (5), GRFL. 
3 Secret Memo, “Kissinger’s visit to Pakistan- an assessment from Washington,” prepared by K.V. Rajan, First 
Sec (Pol) on 13 Aug 1976, sent by A.P. Venkateswaran, Minister (Political) in Washington to I.P. Singh, Joint 
Secretary (Pakistan-Af), MEA, New Delhi, 15 August 1976, WII/104/48/76, MEA, Dr. Henry Kissinger’s Visit 
to Pakistan and France - Papers Re., 1976, National Archives of India, New Delhi (hereafter, NAI). 
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restrained,4 Kissinger initiated a review of U.S. nonproliferation policy that led to a U.S.-led 
multilateral effort through the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) with the goal 
to harmonize nuclear export policies of major supplier states. Among the seven original 
members of the NSG, disagreements with and opposition to U.S. goals of strengthening 
export controls were frequently expressed by France and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG)— two key supplier states at the time.5 Nuclear exports were lucrative, which neither 
Paris or Bonn were eager to accept controls on. If consensus had to be reached, multilateral 
summitry like the NSG meetings, had to be complemented with private bilateral negotiations 
between the United States and the supplier governments.6 This paper is an examination of 
U.S. efforts to enhance export controls on nuclear transfers by two of its major European 
allies during 1974-1976, and their implications for the nonproliferation regime.  
 
France and the FRG did not fully share U.S. concerns that nuclear proliferation threatened 
international security. Instead, they were concerned about the survival and well-being of their 
nuclear industry that needed exports in the face of a saturated national market (France) and 
declining domestic demand (FRG). Renewed interest in nuclear energy in the wake of the 
1973 oil price shock was, therefore, a welcome development for these two supplier states. 
U.S. efforts to curb their nuclear exports were, therefore, naturally perceived by Paris and 
Bonn as ‘unfair.’7 For Kissinger in the Ford administration, the “main concern was based on 
rapid spread of power reactors as a result of the recent oil price increases,” as a result of 																																																								
4 Secret Memo prepared by J.S. Teja (Joint Secretary, Americans Division) at MEA, New Delhi, “India’s 
Peaceful Nuclear Experiment- American Reaction, 22 May 1974, WII/103(18)74, MEA, India’s peaceful 
nuclear experiment- 18.5.74- official American reaction, 1974, NAI. 
5 In this article, the terms, ‘West Germany’ and the ‘Federal Republic of Germany’ (FRG) have been used 
interchangeably.  
6 For works that underline the importance of both multilateral ad bilateral approaches, see William Burr, "A 
Scheme of ‘Control’: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, 1974–1976," The 
International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 252-76; See also: Rodney W. Jones at al., The Nuclear 
Suppliers and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1984). 
7 Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: The Remaking of U.S. Policy. (Cambridge: New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 93-97. 
Sarkar 2018 
JCWS 
 
 
4 
which, some officials from the State Department began to claim that the United States had 
“taken a clear decision to be in the fore-front for the supply of nuclear power reactors as they 
felt that this would give the opportunity to exercise the maximum control.”8 The argument 
was if the United States, “(D)id not some other country would provide the reactors and 
possibly not enforce equally stringent safeguards.”9 
 
An economic logic was also at play, and the U.S. policy response was not merely a political 
retaliation against India’s 1974 nuclear test. During the latter half of the 1970s, U.S leverage 
as the most important nuclear supplier was on the decline while both French and German 
market shares in nuclear plant sales increased several folds.10 For the period 1965-1969, the 
French held a market share of 5.5% of nuclear plants exported to the non-communist world, 
which increased to 18% in 1975-79. For the German nuclear industry, the market share for 
nuclear plants sold to the non-communist world increased from 7.5% in 1965-1969 to 20% in 
1975-1979. In other words, while the superpowers were still the major nuclear suppliers in 
the world, two major industrially advanced West European countries were fast catching up. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) took a unilateral decision in 
July 1974 to suspend the signing of long-term enrichment contracts that hit hard the West 
European and Japanese governments, which depended on U.S.-supplied low-enriched 
uranium to operate their light-water reactors. Although it was a commercial move by the 
USAEC to relinquish less lucrative activities, the USAEC decision caused much 
consternation among U.S. allies, and raised doubts about Washington’s reliability as a 
nuclear supplier. This gave additional impetus to countries like France and FRG to develop 
																																																								
8 Secret Correspondence No. 2004/MIN/74 from E. Gonsalves (Minister) Indian Embassy, Washington DC to 
V.C. Trivedi (Secretary (East), MEA, New Delhi, 22 Nov. 1974, WII/103(18)74, MEA, India’s peaceful nuclear 
experiment-18.5.74- official American reaction, 1974, NAI.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Jones at al., The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation, p. 67. 
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their expertise in full fuel-cycle technologies, and sell them abroad, e.g., Bonn’s attempt to 
sell German jet-nozzle technology for uranium enrichment to Brazil.11  
 
In this study, the term, ‘whack-a-mole’  has been used to convey the difficult task that U.S. 
policymakers faced in terms of implementing their global nonproliferation efforts on the 
supply side: private firms providing nuclear assistance were often in formal or informal 
coalitions with pro-exports government bureaucracies and national atomic energy 
commisisons. Owing to the multiplicity of actors involved in the supply of nuclear 
technologies and equipment, U.S. actors struggled to impose controls eliciting the imagery of 
the game of whack-a-mole, where everytime the opponent is defeated or ‘whacked,’ it rapidly 
resurfaces. As the subsequent sections of this article will reveal, centralization of 
government-industry relations in France, and their decentralized character in the FRG posed 
related but different sets of problems to U.S. nonproliferation efforts. More importantly, the 
unique character of the city of Berlin in the Cold War’S East-West divide, particularly during 
era of Ostpolitik of reduced tensions between the two German states, became a source of 
concern for the three occupying powers of West Berlin— was West Berlin and its private 
firms going to be subject to the NSG guidelines being formulated in London? This was most 
relevant for the Borsig deal that this paper examines involving the FRG and India.  
 
Apart from French, German and American secondary sources, this paper uses recently 
declassified documents from the National Archives and Records Administration in College 
Park, MD, National Archives of India in New Delhi, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in 
Ann Arbor, MI, Archives Diplomatiques in La Courneuve, relevant edited volumes of the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, and the digitized collections such as the CIA Research 
																																																								
11 Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p. 15. 
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Tool (CREST) Database, Wilson Center Digital Archive and the Digital National Security 
Archive.12 Based on the archival evidence analyzed, the paper argues that despite extensive 
U.S. efforts to dissuade France and the FRG to provide nuclear transfers to sensitive states, 
U.S. policy only registered partial success. Washington was more successful in strengthening 
French nuclear export controls than German ones. The ‘Giscardist turn’ in France faciliated 
cooperation between Paris and Washington during the Ford administration, and Franco-
American coordination on nuclear nonproliferation remained cordial during the Carter years. 
The Schmidt-Genscher front against restrictions on German nuclear exports stalled U.S. 
progress in Bonn. While both countries participated in the London-based NSG meetings and 
accepted the NSG guidelines broadly speaking, the implementation of those rules were 
imperfect, as both supplier governments understandably took a sympathetic view of the 
interests of their nuclear industries.  
 
In the historiography of U.S. nonproliferation policy, Gavin argues that the United States 
consistently prioritized its goal of nonproliferation.13 Others disagree on different grounds: 
one strand argues that not all U.S. administrations had the same level of commitment to U.S. 
nonproliferation policy 14  while another strand argues that U.S. geopolitical interests 
frequently triumphed over its nonproliferation concerns, which raises question about Gavin’s 
point about consistency.15 That the United States had historically adopted a plethora of 
initiatives like the NPT, the NSG and the Euratom Treaty in order to stall, divert and prevent 																																																								
12 Further archival evidence is expected to incoporated from the UK National Archives, the French Diplomatic 
Archives and the German Federal Foreign Ministry Archives or Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt in 
Berlin by the summer of 2018. Several interviews of former policymakers have been conducted for the larger 
project but since those concern the later period where declassified documents are few, those have not been used 
for this paper.  
13 Francis J. Gavin, "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and 
Nonproliferation," International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Summer 2015), pp. 9-46. 
14 Or Rabinowitz and James Cameron, "Eight Lost Years? Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and the Non-Proliferation 
Regime, 1969–1977," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 40 No. 6 (2016), pp. 839-866. 
15 Thomas Cavanna, "Geopolitics over Nonproliferation: The Origins of the Grand Strategy and the Implications 
for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia," Journal of Strategic Studies, 2016, early view/online. 
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nuclear weapons ambitions of states has been examined by scholars in recent studies.16 Some 
have even demonstrated that given U.S. concerns of nonproliferation and limited capability to 
prevent proliferation worldwide, Washington concluded ‘deals’ with proliferators in order to 
obfuscate public knowledge of their nuclear weapons programs.17  
 
With the exception of William Burr’s analysis of the NSG, the historiography is rather thin 
on U.S. nonproliferation efforts at the international level, notably, toward industrially 
advanced supplier states.18 Although there is a nascent body of literature in political science 
on nuclear suppliers, it does not yet shed light on U.S. nonproliferation policy toward 
supplier states.19 This conforms to the larger trend in the literature on nuclear proliferation, 
where there is a lop-sided emphasis on recipients, namely, those countries that procure 
nuclear assistance to develop nuclear weapons or retain a ‘nuclear option’. The literature says 
little about supplier states, their nuclear industries, U.S. influence on their export controls or 
how the supplier governments resolve disputes between rival groups of pro-controls and pro-
exports positions. Michael Brenner and J. Samuel Walker both provide insightful details on 
steps undertaken by the Ford and Carter administrations at the domestic level to strengthen 																																																								
16 Hal Brands, "Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee and U.S. National Security Policy," 
Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 83-113; Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: 
Proliferation from the 1960s," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 110-135; William 
Burr, "A Scheme of ‘Control’: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, 1974–1976," 
The International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 252-276; John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping 
Europe: U.S. Technological Collaboration and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016); Francis J. 
Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2012). 
17 Or Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests : Washington and Its Cold War Deals (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014); Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller, "Keeping the Bombs in the 
Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan," International Security, Vol. 
40, No. 1 (Summer 2015), pp. 47-86. 
18 Burr, “A Scheme of ‘Control;” See also: William Glenn Gray, "Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: 
The Us-German Feud over Brazil, 1975–7," The International History Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2012), pp. 449-
474; Fabian Hilfrich, "Roots of Animosity: Bonn’s Reaction to US Pressures in Nuclear Proliferation," The 
International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 277-301. 
19 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb : Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010); Matthew Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance : How "Atoms for Peace" 
Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012); Alexander H.  Montgomery, 
"Stop Helping Me: When Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs," in Adam Stulberg and Matthew 
Fuhrmann, eds., The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2013). 
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nonproliferation norms, like, the creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the ban 
on commercial reprocessing.20 Neither shed light on the international level, and U.S. policy 
challenges vis-à-vis foreign nuclear suppliers. There is a clear opportunity, therefore, for this 
paper to fill the above-mentioned lacunae in the literature, and bring a more holistic 
understanding of U.S. nonproliferation policy through examining Washington’s efforts to 
strengthen export control regulations in France and the FRG.  
 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: First, it examines the multilateral nonproliferation 
efforts undertaken during the Ford and Carter administrations, notably, the formation of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and domestic legislations like the Glenn and Symington 
amendments, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. Second, it studies the character of French 
and West German nuclear assistance. Third, it analyses French nuclear assistance to Pakistan 
on reprocessing, and ensuing U.S. policy response of quid pro quo bargains. Fourth, it 
examines German assistance to India’s heavy water plants, and U.S. efforts without adequate 
‘carrots’ or incentives. Finally, the paper concludes by summarizing the findings and 
underlining the implications for current debates on U.S. nonproliferation policy.  
 
I.  Presidents Ford and Carter Harmonize Nuclear Export Controls  
Article III. 2 of the NPT underlines obligations of its signatories to accept export control 
measures without clearly stating the exact nature of policy requirements.21 As a result, soon 
after the NPT entered into force in March 1970, a group of NPT signatories and prospective 
																																																								
20 Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation; Samuel J. Walker, "Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: 
The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974-1980," Diplomatic History, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 215–
249.  
21 It simply states: “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable 
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of 
special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special 
fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.” See the text of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, last accessed Sep. 1, 2016: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text  
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signatories held a series of confidential meetings in Vienna from 1971 onward under the 
chairmanship of Swiss professor Claude Zangger to discuss the implementation of Article 
III.2. This grouping of states called itself the NPT Exporters Committee, and was informally 
known as the Zangger Committee after its first chairman. The goal of the Zangger Committee 
was to devise a list of commodities that would be subject to export controls through a set of 
common guidelines accepted by its members. These guidelines or ‘Understandings’ were not 
to be legally binding while upholding harmonized export policy declarations of its 
members.22 The core precept of the Committee was two-fold: to prevent proliferation of 
nuclear weapons through an uncontrolled trade in nuclear materials and equipment, and to 
ensure that major nuclear suppliers conform to the same export control guidelines such that 
no exporter gets competitive advantage over another. 
 
One major impediment remained: France was a key nuclear exporter but not a signatory to 
the NPT, and therefore not part of the Zangger Committee. Without bringing Paris into 
harmonized export control guidelines, the goal of nonproliferation would remain incomplete. 
By 1972, the Zangger Committee members reached consensus on the items in the “trigger 
list” but did not publish the guidelines until August 1974 because of Soviet delays in 
participating in the Committee. 23 It was not without reason, then, that some commentators 
noted that the NPT was challenged in May 1974 even before it was fully in place.24 The issue 
of French participation in any future multilateral effort in export controls was of paramount 
importance. 25 It was by including France in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (known as the 
																																																								
22 Fritz W Schmidt, "The Zangger Committee: Its History and Future Role," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 
2, No. 1 (1994), pp. 38- 44. 
23 The trigger list of the Zangger Committee consists of restricted items whose export will ‘trigger’ IAEA 
safeguards. They are restricted because of their deemed use in nuclear weapons development and developing 
nuclear fuel cycles.  
24 Robert Boardman and James F. Keeley, eds., Nuclear Exports and World Politics: Policy and Regime (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 213. 
25 Burr, “A Scheme of ‘Control,” pp. 252-76. 
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London Suppliers Conference at the time) that one major loophole in the nonproliferation 
regime could be plugged, i.e. harmonizing nuclear export controls independent of NPT 
membership.26 
 
In the aftermath of the 1974 Indian nuclear test, the National Security Study Memorandum 
(NSSM) 202 of May 1974 and the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 255 of 
June 1974 together comprised the backbone of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy of the 
time. While NSDM 255 underlined the importance of a conference of nuclear suppliers to 
coordinate export policy to prevent proliferation, NSSM 202 called for a complete review of 
U.S. policy towards the NPT.27 A further study by the NSC from December 1974 noted that 
while there was U.S. dominance as the international nuclear supplier, its leverage in global 
nuclear commerce was diminishing. It stated, ‘Loss of U.S. dominance in the peaceful 
nuclear area could allow customers to deal with other suppliers who impose less rigorous 
controls on sensitive material, equipment and technology.’28 As a result, a ‘conference of 
nuclear industrialized states would provided a unique opportunity for realizing such a 
coordinated approach.’29 It added that Soviet and French participation were crucial to the 
implementation of the nuclear suppliers conference.  
 
By the end of 1974, it became clear that U.S. policy would constitute four key elements. 
First, a nuclear suppliers conference comprising of the major industrialized  countries — 
mostly West European states, Japan and Australia — would be formed with the close 
cooperation of the United Kingdom and Canada, to help coordinate nuclear exports. 																																																								
26 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the London Suppliers Conference have been used interchangeably 
throughout the text. 
27 “National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202, 23 May 1974, last accessed 21 January 2018: 
http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_202.pdf 
28 “Memorandum for President from Robert S. Ingersoll, Chairman of NSC Undersecretaries Committee, NSC-
U/DM-7A, 4 December 1974,” NARA, CREST, CIA-RDP81B00080R001600010016-7. 
29  Ibid. 
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Secondly, the United States would give a major push in favor of ratification of the NPT for 
industrialized nations that are also major nuclear exporters, like the FRG, Italy and Japan, 
especially in anticipation of the 1975 NPT Review Conference. Thirdly, the ‘PNE loophole’ 
had to be eradicated. This was done through seeking assurances from India that U.S. 
shipments of fuel for Tarapur reactors would not be used in nuclear explosives, discouraging 
indigenous PNE programs by countries, and signing the Threshold Test Ban Treaty with the 
Soviet Union that prevented nuclear tests of devices of yield higher than 150 kilotons. Fourth 
and finally, demands of countries for enrichment and reprocessing were to be met through 
multilateral facilities under IAEA safegaurds to offset indigenous development of capabilities 
and diversion of materials and technology for military purposes.30  
 
By the time in early 1975, when the multilateral platform of exporters met as the London 
Suppliers Conference, it was clear that U.S.–European differences were extensive.31  The 
European governments considered U.S. calls for strict controls to prevent proliferation as an 
attempt to offset their commercial gains from nuclear exports. In January 1976, when the 
Suppliers Conference published its guidelines, George Vest, Assistant Secretrary of State for 
Politico-Military affairs and a key player at the negotiations, noted that while Washington 
was successful in getting the French and the Germans to agree in principle to restrict access 
to sensitive nuclear technology, indigeous development and unsafeguarded facilities 
continued to pose risks to US nonproliferation goals.32  The formation of the London 
Suppliers Group did not sit well with members of the nuclear industry, and some developing 
countries, and both had their own line of reasoning. On the one hand, the industry was 
																																																								
30 “Memorandum for President from Robert S. Ingersoll, Chairman of NSC Undersecretaries Committee, NSC-
U/DM-7A, 4 December 1974,” NARA, CREST, CIA-RDP81B00080R001600010016-7. 
31 Samuel J. Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation,” pp. 215- 49. 
32 “George Vest to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Suppliers Status Report',” January 27, 1976, History and Public 
Policy Program Digital Archive, RG 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-77, box 7, Nuclear Suppliers 
Conference. Obtained and contributed by William Burr. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119821 
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disdainful for commercial losses it would incur from cancellation of orders by recipients 
upset by the new restrictions. On the other hand, developing countries that sought nuclear 
assistance at the time, like Iran, Brazil, Yugoslavia and others, called the Suppliers 
Conference a violation of Article IV of the NPT.33 They argued that the ‘grand bargain’ of 
the NPT whereby non-nuclear weapon states renounced the development of nuclear weapons 
for access to peaceful nuclear assistance was being held hostage by the supplier guidelines on 
export controls.34 During the Carter administration, representatives from the nuclear industry 
(U.S. and others), developing countries and US officials would meet in Shiraz, Iran at the 
invitation of the Shah to voice their concerns against Carter’s nonproliferation policy in what 
would be known as the ‘Persepolis Declaration’ of 1977.35 
 
During the Ford and Carter administrations, new U.S. domestic legislations played a 
key role in nonproliferation. These were the Symington amendment of 1976, the Glenn 
amendment of 1977 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. The Symington 
amendment added section 669 to the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was proposed by 
Stuart Symington, senator from Missouri, and passed by the Congress on 30 June 1976. This 
amendment prohibited all U.S. economic and military aid to any country exporting or 
importing reprocessing and enrichment facilities and related materials and technology 
without full-scope safeguards. During the Carter administration, in August 1977, the Glenn 
Amendment replaced the section 669 to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act with a new section 
																																																								
33 Dane Swango, "The United States and the Role of Nuclear Co-Operation and Assistance in the Design of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty," The International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 210-29. See also: 
Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 157.  
34 Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p. 156.  
35 Secret telegram from US embassy in Tehran to State Department, 14 April 1977, 1977TEHRAN03219, 
RG59, NARA. See: Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p. 154. See also: Farzan Sabet, “The April 
1977 Persepolis Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology: A Third World Revolt Against US Non-
Proliferation Policy?,” The International History Review, 2017, early view/online first. 
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that solely dealt with uranium enrichment and transfers. In addition, the amendment added 
section 670 on nuclear transfers related to uranium reprocessing. 36 
 
The Carter administration’s efforts to make far-reaching changes in U.S. domestic and 
international nuclear policies — codified in Presidential Directive 8— culminated into a 
multilateral study on proliferation risks of fuel cycles, particularly the viability of plutonium 
reprocessing and breeder reactors, known as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
(INFCE) launched in October 1977.37 It was believed by the Carter administration that the 
INFCE would facilitate US nonproliferation goals by creating consciousness among suppliers 
and recipients (unlike the NSG that only involved suppliers) about the proliferation dangers 
from civilian nuclear programs. Given the extensive modifications that Washington sought 
from foreign countries, particularly the call to give up breeder reactors to tackle the 
plutonium economy, key policymakers like Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert Fri realized that US 
policy goals could only be attained through a consultative process, and not a coercive 
policy.38 Over the next two years, INFCE would overshadow the NSG. Suppliers and 
recipients would be invited to come together to tackle the plutonium economy, President 
Carter’s top priority. While the INFCE meetings was proceeded in Vienna, President Carter 
signed into law the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) in March 1978 that had a far-
reaching impact on U.S. nuclear export controls. The NNPA was a watershed in U.S. 
nonproliferation policy on the one hand, and the cause of much consternation for suppliers 
and recipients, on the other. It required recipient states to accept full-scope safeguards in 
																																																								
36 In 1979, the Carter administration found Pakistan in violation of the Symington Amendment owing to its 
clandestine construction of a uranium enrichment plant. Reiss, Mitchell. Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries 
Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 213-214.  
37 Presidential Directive/NSC-8, Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 24 March 1977: 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd08.pdf  
38 For an analysis of the domestic and international policy changes sought by the Carter administration, see 
Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, pp. 116-212.  
Sarkar 2018 
JCWS 
 
 
14 
order to receive U.S. nuclear assistance, and Washington’s consent for retransfers and storage 
of any U.S.-origin materials even when provided by another supplier.39 
 
II.  French and West German Nuclear Industries in the late 1970s 
The 1973 oil price shock led to increasing interest in nuclear energy as an alternative source 
of energy leading to higher demand from several developing countries. India’s nuclear test in 
May 1974 raised proliferation concerns for Washington but not for its allies in France and the 
FRG that sought to cash in on the demand for nuclear assistance. Two months later, the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission’s (USAEC) unilateral decision in July 1974 to suspend the 
signing of long-term enrichment contracts hit hard the West European and Japanese 
governments that depended on U.S.-supplied low-enriched uranium to operate their light-
water reactors. Taken as a commercial decision to ease burden on less financially lucrative 
activities, the USAEC decision was announced with little anticipation of reaction from allies. 
This gave an additional impetus to countries like France and the FRG to develop their own 
expertise in fuel-cycle technologies and sell them abroad (for example, the German attempt 
to sell Brazil jet-nozzle technology for uranium enrichment).40 During 1975-1979, both 
French and German nuclear plant exports increased several folds.41 For the period 1965-
1969, the French held a market share of 5.5% of nuclear plants exported to the non-
communist world, which increased to 18% in 1975-79. For the German nuclear industry, the 
market share for nuclear plants sold to the non-communist world increased from 7.5% in 
1965-1969 to 20% in 1975-1979. While the superpowers were still the major nuclear 
suppliers in the world, the industrially advanced economies of Paris and Bonn were fast 
catching up.  																																																								
39 Frederick Williams, Gunter Hildenbrand, P.R. Chari and Ryukicki Imai. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
of 1978." International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 44-66. 
40 Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation, p. 15. 
41 Jones et al., The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation, p. 67. 
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The character of government-industry relations in the two countries, however, was 
vastly different. The French nuclear industry was heavily state-led and state-subsidized while 
its German counterpart developed through a combination of laissez-faire economy and state 
planning. In France, the Ministry of Industry led energy and industrial policies while the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense oversaw external nuclear relations and nuclear 
weapons respectively. The French Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat a l’Energie 
Atomique or CEA) was responsible for nuclear R&D and the fuel cycle, and the Electricité de 
France was the state-owned utility provider.42 When heavy investment was made in the early 
1970s following the oil price shock, a monopoly supply structure was promoted that led to 
Framatome (currently, known as Areva) as the main nuclear plant contractor in France. 
Framatome was part of the Creuset-Loire steel and heavy engineering group. As the paper 
will demonstrate, the CEA enjoyed a near monopoly over French nuclear export policy until 
Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing’s government challenged it through institutional reorganization.  
 
In the FRG, collective planning was operationalized by senior executives in firms, 
banks, utility providers, R&D institutions, and government branches through their meetings 
on supervisory boards and overlapping shareholding.43 Kraftwerk Union AG (KWU), a 
subsidiary of Siemens, held monopoly over German nuclear contracts, particularly reactors. 
Nuclear export policy was influenced by various actors, namely, Hoechst for fuel cycle, 
Dresdner Bank for capital, RWE as utility provider, and the German Ministry of Research 
and Technology or the technical ministry (BMFT) for R&D funds. Nuclear export licensing 
was left to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (BMWi) while government-industry relations 
were the domain of the Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT)— both ministries 																																																								
42 William Walker and Måns Lönnroth. Nuclear Power Struggles : Industrial Competition and Proliferation 
Control (London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 54.  
43 Ibid, p. 62.  
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favored nuclear assistance and opposed export controls.44 The BMFT was also in charge of 
representing West Germany at the IAEA, which made the opponents of export controls also 
national representatives at the key international forum.45 Three key factors gave nuclear 
exports their unique character in the West German case. First, West Germany was an export-
led economy, where nuclear exports were treated like any other exports. The economic need 
to sell nuclear techonologies and equipment abroad was therefore relatively higher for Bonn 
than it was for Paris. Second, an important element of Ostpolitik was to enhance Bonn’s 
political influence at international fora and abroad such that nuclear exports to countries in 
Latin America and Asia were deemed as means to that end.46 Third and finally, West 
Germany experienced a strong anti-nuclear grassroots movement characterized by mass 
protests at reactor construction sites such as the well-known site occupation in Wyhl in the 
upper Rhine valley in February 1975.47 As a result, it became a necessity for West German 
firms to find markets abroad in order to tackle the political challenges of constructing nuclear 
facilities at home. 
 
For the United States, getting France on board was pivotal to its multilateral efforts at 
harmonizing suppliers states’ export policies. Paris had not signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), was skeptical of IAEA safeguards, and had a nuclear industry 
that was heavily dependent on exports. On the other hand, the FRG had held off ratifying the 
NPT for almost five years after signing the NPT in 1969. The West Germans argued that the 
treaty could hamper commercial interests of its nuclear industry. American anxiety over 																																																								
44 Harald Müller, After the Scandals: West German Nonproliferation Policy (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt, 1990). 
45 Ibid. 
46 On Ostpolitik and West Germany’s aspirations to play a major role on international platforms on issues such 
as terrorism see Bernhard Blumenau, The United Nations and Terrorism : Germany, Multilateralism, and 
Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
47 For a transnational history of anti-nuclear activism in West Germany and France during this period see 
Andrew S. Tompkins, Better Active Than Radioactive! : Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West 
Germany (New York, NY: Oxford University, 2016). 
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German commitment to nonproliferation was so high that the 1974 Indian nuclear test led 
some State Department officials to wonder whether it could derail the German ratification of 
the NPT. The U.S. embassy in Bonn reassured that because the Bundestag had already 
completed parliamentary ratification of the treaty, West Germany was unlikely to reverse its 
course. 48 By the fall of 1974, the German nuclear industry started negotiations with India for 
supplying dual-use items. After some delays, Bonn ratified the NPT in May 1975, just a 
month or so before signing with Brasilia its nuclear ‘deal of the century.’49 
 
III.  France as Nuclear Supplier: The Giscardist Turn 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing became the first non-Gaullist leader of the French Fifth Republic 
on 19 May 1974 by narrowly winning against Socialist contender François Mitterrand.50 
Giscard d’Estaing was a Gaullist-backed candidate in the 1974 elections but disagreements 
soon emerged between him and his Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (the leader of the Gaullist 
faction), particularly, on the question of French nuclear export policy. The French president 
favored a strong commitment to nonproliferation while his Gaullist prime minister was 
committed to an active nuclear export policy in line with the CEA and the French nuclear 
industry. 51 Faced with domestic political opposition from the Gaullists led by Chirac, and the 
																																																								
48 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, “Indian Nuclear Testing and FRG NPT 
ratification,” 20 May 1974, 1974BONN08038 and Secret telegram from State Department to US embassy in 
New Delhi, 22 May 1974, 1974STATE106702, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG-59, State Department 
Telegrams created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979, NARA. 
49 On the Germany-Brazil nuclear cooperation of the 1970s see : Gray, “Commercial Liberties and Nuclear 
Anxieties,” pp. 449-474; Hilfrich, "Roots of Animosity," pp. 277-301; William  Lowrance, "Nuclear Futures for 
Sale: To Brazil from West Germany," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1976), pp. 147-166; Dani K. 
Nedal and Tatiana Cuotto, "Brazil's 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West Germany," NPIHP Research Update, 
Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Washington, DC, Aug. 2013; Carlo Patti, "Origins and 
Evolution of the Brazilian Nuclear Program (1947-2011)," NPIHP Research Update, Nuclear Proliferation 
International History Project, Washington, DC, Nov. 2012. 
50 BBC News, “On this day, 1974: Giscard d’Estaing voted as French President,” 19 May 1974, last accessed 21 
January 2018,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/19/newsid_2510000/2510979.stm  
51 Georges-Henri Soutou, "La France et La Non-Prolifération Nucléaire: Une histoire complexe," Revue 
historique des armées, Vol. 262 (2011)., pp. 35-45. For an overview of the evolution of French non-
proliferation policy until contemporary times see also: Bruno Tertrais, “France and nuclear non-proliferation: 
From benign neglect to active promotion,” in Olav Njolstad, eds., Nuclear Proliferation and International 
Order: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 217-226. 
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Socialists led by Mitterrand, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s aimed to improve his relations with 
the United States. The French president’s meeting with his American counterpart in 
Martinique in December 1974 initiated the process of Franco-American rapprochement. At 
this meeting, President Giscard d’Estaing assured President Gerald Ford that while France 
shared the U.S. concern of nuclear proliferation, and assured his commitment to 
nonproliferation. 52 
 
The Gaullists had a very particular view of the role of nuclear weapons in the international 
system: an increase in the number of nuclear-armed countries would challenge the nuclear 
dominance of the superpowers, and create much space for maneuver for middle-powers like 
France.53 In addition to this almost Waltzian belief in ‘more may be better’ albeit for very 
different ends, there was a strong economic rationale in nuclear exports for the CEA and 
France’s largely state-controlled industry.54 In other words, reining in French nuclear exports 
was going to be an uphill task for the French president.  Between 1974 and 1976, Giscard 
d’Estaing’s nonproliferation policy would revolved around French participation in the NSG, 
and allowing the United States to coerce South Korea to pull out of its contract with the CEA 
on a plutonium reprocessing plant despite acute opposition of the CEA and the Gaullists by 
Chirac in the French National Assembly. 55  
 																																																								
52 Florent Pouponneau, "Les Changements De La Polique Française D'exportation Nucléaires (1974-1976): Un 
Triple Double Jeu," Critique Internationale, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2013), p. 112.  
53 Maurice Vaïsse, "L’historiographie française relative au nucléaire," Revue historique des armées, Vol. 262 
(2011), pp. 3-8; Maurice Vaïsse, eds., La France Et L'atome: Etudes D'histoire Nucléaire (Brussels: Bruylant, 
1994).  
54 See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons : More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers, (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). 
55 France became the only non-NPT state to be participating in the NSG. For the differences between the 
diplomats at Quai d’Orsay and the CEA scientists over French participation in the NSG and the subsequent 
adherence to the NSG guidelines in French nuclear export policy, Florent Pouponneau and Frédéric Merand, 
"Diplomatic Practices, Domestic Fields, and the International System: Explaining France’s Shift on Nuclear 
Nonproliferation," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2017), pp. 123-35. See also William Burr, 
“The Making of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 1974-1976,” NPIHP Research Update, Nuclear Proliferation 
International History Project, Washington, DC, April 2014. 
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By the summer of 1976, Giscard was aided by Chirac’s resignation from his government. 
With Chirac’s exit from the government in late August 1976, and his replacement by 
Giscard’s loyalist Raymond Barre, the French President was able to better consolidate his 
power. Louis de Guiringaud, who replaced Jean Sauvanargues as the as the French foreign 
minister in 1976, was also more committed to nonproliferation. Soon after that year, 
President Giscard d’Estaing established the Conseil de politique nucléaire extérieure (CPNE 
or Council on Nuclear Export Policy) to institionalize the Quai d’Orsay’s oversight over the 
CEA’s nuclear export policy. The CPNE needed to approve the CEA’s foreign activities, 
including the nature of technology and materials pledged to recipient states and the amount 
and terms of loans offered to facilitate the transactions. Moreover, the goal of the CPNE was 
to redefine French nuclear export policy in line with the ‘London Supplier Guidelines’ or the 
NSG guidelines that had been recently finalized in the British capital. 56 The role of the 
CPNE was instrumental in the French declaration in December 1974 to not authorize any 
new sale of reprocessing plants to foreign countries, much to the the consternation of the 
West Germans. During the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the Franco-Pakistani contract for the 
construction of a plutonium-reprocessing plant would become a test case for both the French 
and the US President’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. 57   
 
French Nuclear Exports Policy and the Pakistan Plutonium Plant Contract 
In December 1974, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission signed a contract with French firm 
Saint Gobain Nouvelle Technique (SGN) for the construction of a prototype plutonium 
reprocessing plant in Pakistan. SGN was a subsidiary of French state-owned Framatome 
																																																								
56 Georges Le Guelte, Histoire de la menace nucléaire (Paris: Hachette, 1997), pp. 213-214. 
57 The French nuclear contract with South Korea to build a reprocessing plant ended in January 1976, when after 
U.S. pressures, Seoul relented and cancelled its contract with France.  
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(present-day Areva), and the main contrator for French nuclear exports.58 As the Ford 
administration kept mounting pressure on Paris to end the agreement, Prime Minister Jacques 
Chirac publicly rejected the idea of discussing the issue with Washington in the name of 
French national sovereignty.59 In June 1976, when Henry Kissinger visited Paris, while 
returning from Islamabad, he faced French media storm for influencing French decisions on 
nuclear exports.60 Nevertheless, a tripartite safeguards agreement involving France, Pakistan 
and the IAEA was signed in March 1976.61  
 
Improved French relations with the United States during Giscard’s presidency was 
noteworthy. A State Department paper on France noted that since Giscard d’Estaing’s 
election, “Acerbic references toward US policies have been absent and a more pragmatic, 
unemotional approach to our relations is evident,” and that contentious issues between the 
two states were minimal.62 However, Giscard was fighting the Gaullists at home, and a 
certain French ‘nuclear orthodoxy.’ An example of this orthodoxy was manifest when in 
November 1974, in his conversation with ACDA Director Fred Iklé, the Secretary General of 
the French foreign ministry, Geoffrey de Courcel said that France believed that no amount of 
safeguards could prevent a country from developing nuclear weapons.63 More importantly, 
France was a key global nuclear supplier that had not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty. As a result, getting Paris on board was key to U.S. supply-side nonproliferation 																																																								
58 SGN was also the French firm that provided French nuclear weapons assistance to Israel. On the Israeli 
nuclear program see : Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). Worst-
Kept Secret : Israel's Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).  
59 “M. Jacques Chirac rejette la proposition américaine d’une négociation tripartite sur l’accord franco-
pakistanais”, Le Monde 12 August 1976, pp.1-4. 
60 Telegram from US Secretary of State to USDel Secretary entitled, “Press Material,” August 1976, Electronic 
telegrams 1/1/1976-12/31/1976, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG59, NARA. 
61 Text of Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan, INFCIRC/239, 
IAEA, last accessed 21 January 2018, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1976/infcirc239.pdf  
62 Memorandum for Major General Brent Scowcroft from George S. Springsteen, with attachment, “Paper on 
France,” 21 August 1974, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 3, Folder France (1), 
GRFL. 
63 “Nuclear Exporters Conference: Conversation of ACDA Director Ikle and Quai d’Orsay Secretary General de 
Courcel,” 29 November 1974, 1974PARIS28614. Quoted in Pouponneau. 
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efforts in the mid-1970s. Despite Giscard’s willingess to work the issue out, challenges 
persisted. In April 1975, the French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues summarized his 
government’s position to his American counterpart.64 The French wanted the decisions in the 
NSG meetings in London to be unanimous and non-retroactive. The authority to implement 
the decisions was to be vested only in the supplier governments, who could also decide to 
withdraw from the NSG at their will. More importantly, the decisions of the NSG could not 
hamper French exports to the Communist world. French also opposed major change to their 
own export practices. France had completely rejected the U.S. proposals that sensitive 
nuclear exports be provided only to those that accepted IAEA safeguards, and that 
reprocessing be only offered on a multinational basis.65  
 
By September 1975, while the French had agreed to participate in the NSG, they had also 
informed the Americans that they would not cancel their agreement to sell the reprocessing 
plant to Pakistan.66 The French President, however, assured that France would not oppose 
U.S. efforts to convince Pakistan to terminate the contract. This meant that the Gaullist 
challenge at home made it difficult for Giscard to actively toe the U.S. line thus making it 
imperative for him to cooperate passively by not opposing U.S. pressure on recipients to 
withdraw from contracts. A State Department briefing paper from September 1975 noted that 
Washington had fruitful bilateral discussions with France on its nuclear cooperation with 
South Korea and Taiwan. Paris had expressed its willingness to not oppose U.S. pressure on 
both Seoul and Taipei. Giscard’s government preferred that the recipient ended contracts 
instead of a withdrawal by France for two important reasons. First, if the recipient ended the 
																																																								
64 Ibid. 
65  State Department Briefing Paper, “Bilateral Talks During UNGA, France – Foreign Minister 
Sauvagnargues,” September 1975, NSA, NSC Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs Country Files 1974-1977, 
Box 8, Folder France, 1975 WH (5), GRFL. 
66 White House Memo, “Meeting with French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud” from Brent Scowcroft, 1 
October 1976, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 3, Folder France (9), GRFL. 
Sarkar 2018 
JCWS 
 
 
22 
contract, the French government could not be compelled to pay compensation to its nuclear 
industry for loss of business overseas.67 Second, the French government could not be directly 
accused of giving in to U.S. pressure on nonproliferation, and thereby able to save face 
before its opponents in the domestic political scene. This explained French acquiescence with 
the U.S. veto to France-ROK agreement on reprocessing, and lack of opposition to U.S. 
efforts to dissuade Pakistan.68  
 
The  CEA, despite having its monopoly challenged by the Giscard government, retained a 
large part of its policy leverage through its technical expertise. Opinions of experts from the 
CEA like Bertrand Goldschmidt, Andre Giraud and others, who were themselves pro-exports, 
were frequently sought — especially informally— to determine whether certain exports 
posed proliferation risks or not. Lack of nonproliferation expertise among French foreign 
policy officials thus jeopardized the Giscard government’s performance on curtailing 
proliferation risks from nuclear trade. One CEA expert even told a Quai d’Orsay that anyone 
could do reprocessing, and thus tried to underplay the obvious nuclear weapons dimension of 
the France-Pakistan agreement.69  
 
Henry Kissinger’s visit to Pakistan and France in August 1976 to discourage the Franco-
Pakistan deal was watched closely by Indian policymakers, who took exception at what they 
called, “Kissinger’s unsubtle methods of publicizing his intentions.” A telegram from the 																																																								
67  Such demand for compensation by the nuclear industry was not unthinkable. The Canadian government was 
sued by the company that lost contract in India in 1976. 
68 On U.S. efforts to dissuade Pakistan see: Or Rabinowitz and Jayita Sarkar, "‘It Isn’t Over Until the Fuel Cell 
Sings’:  A Reassessment of U.S. and French Pledges of Nuclear Assistance in the 1970s," Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 41, no. 1-2 (2018), pp. 275-300. For Pakistani perspectives on this subject see also: Feroze Khan, 
Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); Rabia 
Akhtar, “Making of the Seventh NWS: Historiography of the Beginning of the Nuclear Disorder in South Asia,” 
The International History Review, 2017, early view/online first. 
 
69 Letter from top-ranking French official in charge of scientific and technical questions at Quai d’Orsay, 
Document furnished by Florent Pouponneau to this author in June 2017. 
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Indian embassy in Washington lamented that, “A face-saving formula which will satisfy the 
Americans and be acceptable to the French and Pakistanis is still possible, but one wonders if 
Kissinger’s style during this trip has made it easier to achieve.”70 The telegram went on to 
add:  
Kissinger’s tactics in Pakistan seem to have made it more difficult for Pakistan to 
achieve its objective, since if it were to give up the re-processing plant it would look 
like abject surrender on the part of Bhutto after repeatedly reiterating his 
determination to go ahead with it. 
 
Quid Pro Quo Bargains with France 
Despite conciliatory gestures at the Martinique Summit in December 1974, French 
cooperation with the United States on nuclear export controls was far from assured.  Yet, the 
Martinique summit paved the way for increased U.S. assistance to France in missile 
development and nuclear safety.71 Given the need for French participation in the NSG, Henry 
Kissinger paved the way for quid pro quo bargains that would satisfy the French, and most 
importantly, discourage Giscard’s Gaullist critics from posing difficulties. French leaders 
also knew how much their American counterparts needed their cooperation. They made a 
series of requests to Washington, and as they had originally expected, they were not 
disappointed. 
 
One of the key impediments to the quid pro quo, however, was NSAM 294: the April 1964 
document that prohibited US governments from assisting France in nuclear weapons 
development and strategic delivery systems given French nuclear policy of force de frappe 
independent of NATO. Over the next years, the Ford administration adopted a series of 																																																								
70 Secret Memo, “Kissinger’s visit to Pakistan- an assessment from Washington,” prepared by K.V. Rajan, First 
Secretary (Political) on 13 Aug 1976, sent by A.P. Venkateswaran, Minister (Political) in Washington to I.P. 
Singh, Joint Secretary (Pakistan-Af) at MEA, 15 August 1976, WII/104/48/76,  Dr. Henry Kissinger’s Visit to 
Pakistan and France - Papers Re., Secret, 1976, MEA, NAI. 
71 Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from David Elliott, Jan Lodal and Hal Sonnenfeldt, “Meeting with the 
French on Non-Proliferation, Safeguards, and the Nuclear Exporters Conference,” NSA, NSC Europe, Canada 
and Ocean Affairs Country Files 1974-1977, Box 7, Folder France, 1974 (3) WH, GRFL. 
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measures that reversed the implications of this policy. The groundwork was already laid 
down earlier, when Kissinger formulated NSDMs 103 and 104 in March 1971 in the context 
of improved Franco-American ties with Nixon and Pompidou’s leadership.72 During the Ford 
administration, American nonproliferation interests were significant in guiding bilateral 
policy towards France.  
 
In August 1975, U.S. company Control Data Corporation applied to the Department of 
Commerce for export license covering the sale of CYBER 76— a cutting-edge 
supercomputer— for French nuclear weapons program. In principle, sale of advanced 
computers for nuclear weapons development could not be allowed to France because of its 
lack of commitment to NATO’s nuclear forces (NSAM 294), and since it was not a party to 
the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. Control Data, however, informed the State Department 
that the company had negotiated the agreement despite known legal difficulties because it 
acted “on French advice that an exception would be made to U.S. policy.”73 The U.S. 
government had vetoed similar past requests by Control Data Corporation, and one by IBM 
because of the equipment’s end-use in the French nuclear weapons program.  
 
Two options were laid out in the memo from George Springsteen to Brent Scowcroft: (1) 
modify the interpretation of U.S. policies under NSAM 294 and the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
to exempt France from the embargo, or (2) make a specific exception in the case of Control 
Data agreement (this would have upset IBM that had made a similar request earlier). 
																																																								
72 National Security Decision Memorandum 103, “Military Cooperation with France,” 29 March 1971, Richard 
Nixon Presidential Library, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_103.pdf, last 
accessed 21 January 2018; National Security Decision Memorandum 104, “Cooperation with France in nuclear 
safety,” 29 March 1971, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, 
https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_104.pdf, last accessed 21 January 2018. 
73 US Department of State Memorandum for Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, “Export of an Advanced 
Computer for French Nuclear Weapons Program,” 19 August 1975, NSA Presidential Country Files for Europe 
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Springsteen noted that the State Department preferred the second option as it would be faster 
and have “more impact on the French as a political gesture than a change in our policy based 
partly on technical factors.”74 Moreover, the second option would need less interagency 
coordination. An exception determined by the NSC could keep the other stakeholders— 
Commerce, Defense, ERDA, ACDA— with their different priorities at bay. A case-specific 
exemption meant that the United States would retain leverage over similar future 
transactions, and the exemption would be less politically costly. 
 
In May 1976, prior to Giscard d’Estaing’s state visit to the United States, Henry Kissinger 
advised President Ford to approve the second option: make an exception to NSAM 294 in the 
Control Data case without modifying the general directive.75 That this U.S. exemption was a 
quid pro quo for greater French cooperation on nuclear export controls was clearly stated by 
Kissinger in the following words: 76  
This would enable us to highlight to Giscard our willingness to move forward in 
military cooperation as a reflection of the kind of bilateral relationship we would like 
to have with France, while expressing our desire for similar cooperation in related 
areas involving the Elysee and the French nuclear bureaucracy, such as civil nuclear 
export policy. For example, I believe that this forward movement could facilitate 
French cooperation in tightening up non-mandatory nuclear suppliers’ guidelines 
governing sensitive nuclear transfers such as national reprocessing facilities. 
 
In fall 1975, as the advanced computer sale was being considered by the Ford administration, 
three separate ‘nuclear’ items came up for review at the State Department. This involved 
French request for liberalization of COCOM policy to allow French reactor sales to the 
Soviet Union, relaxation of US control of French light water reactor licenses 
(Westinghouse/Framatome), and allow depleted uranium (tails) to remain in the Soviet 																																																								
74 Ibid. 
75 Secretary of State’s Memorandum to the President, “Control Data Corporation’s Request for Export License,” 
15 May 1976,  NSA Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Canada-State Department Telegrams, 
Box 3, Folder France (7), GRFL. 
76 Ibid. 
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Union.77 It was decided that the French request for reactor sale to the Soviet Union would be 
allowed in the same line as the West German request was in June 1975 as stated in NSDM 
298.78 Additionally, it was noted that for future COCOM cases involving exports to nuclear 
weapon states, IAEA safeguards would only be required if there was a significant risk of 
diversion to military uses.79  
 
With respect to the reactor licensing issue, Washington decided to modify the Code of 
Federal Regulations to provide a general authorization for transfers that have already been 
authorized by COCOM with U.S. government concurrence. That way, French companies (in 
this case, Framatome) would not have to seek through their US licensor (i.e. Westinghouse) 
approval of the ERDA — the federal agency that succeeded the USAEC in late 1974 and was 
superseded by the U.S. Department of Energy in 1977— over and above U.S. approval in 
COCOM.80 
 
The NSDM 275 of October 1974 had noted that the Ford administration required depleted 
uranium to be returned from the Soviet Union. 81  However, it also stated that if “significant 
opposition” arose in COCOM at a future date, then the United States would examine its 
policy to draw an acceptable compromise. NSDM 275 amply underlined the relationship 																																																								
77 US Department of State Memorandum for Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft by George S. Springsteen, 
“Department of State Views on US/French Bilateral Issues,” 5 September 1975, NSA Files, NSC Europe, 
Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff: Files, 1974-1977, Country File: France, 1975 WH (5), Box 8, Folder France, 
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78 This policy document stated that the United States was prepared to grant an exemption to the West German 
reactor sale pending before COCOM if the Soviets supplied uranium and assurances that the use would be for 
peaceful purposes only. See: National Security Decision Memorandum 298, 14 June 1975, GRFL. 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nsdm298.pdf (last accessed June 21, 2016) 
79 Ibid.  
80 France-Iranian nuclear cooperation contracts that were underway during this period involved reactors to be 
built under Framatome/Westinghouse joint licenses. On concurrent French, German and American negotiations 
with Iran on nuclear cooperation see Jacob Darwin Hamblin, "The Nuclearization of Iran in the Seventies," 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 38, No. 5 (2014), pp. 1114-1135. 
81 National Security Decision Memorandum 275, “COCOM Position on the Return of Depleted Uranium (Tails) 
from the USSR,” 10 October 1974, GRFL, 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nsdm275.pdf, last accessed 21 January 2018. 
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between cooperation within COCOM and US interests in securing cooperation of other 
nuclear supplier states for nonproliferation. In the wake of the French request that depleted 
uranium (or tails) remain in the Soviet Union, the State Department judged that a 
compromise could be drawn that was specified in NSDM 275, and that French request could 
be considered as “significant opposition” in the COCOM.  
 
The State Department memo with the above decisions was sent to Brent Scowcroft prior to 
the nuclear suppliers meeting of September 1975. It noted that it was “highly desirable to use 
possible U.S. movement on French requests to maximize French responsiveness” on its 
nuclear export policy stance.82 The memo noted that the United States should in return seek 
from France (1) restraint in future transfers of sensitive nuclear technology, (2) provisions in 
future agreements that required suppliers’ consent for end-use and obligatory no-PNE and 
permanent safeguards, (3) safeguards on reactors especially on natural uranium and advanced 
reactors, and (4) continuation of bilateral consultations with the United States on nuclear 
export cases of special concern.  
 
This tit-for-tat nature of cooperation between Washington and Paris characterized Franco-
American cooperation on nuclear export controls in the latter part of the 1970s. It helped to 
gradually dissipate the bilateral mistrust of the Gaullist era, and pave a new phase in the 
bilateral partnership in nonproliferation policy. Washington, however, was more successful 
with the French and had only mixed success with the Germans. Chancellor Schmidt and his 
Foreign Minister Genscher favored German nuclear exports as a source of financial profit 
unlike the Giscard government in France that wanted to improve relations with the United 																																																								
82 US Department of State Memorandum for Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft by George S. Springsteen, 
“Department of State Views on US/French Bilateral Issues,” 5 September 1975, NSA Files, NSC Europe, 
Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff: Files, 1974-1977, Country File: France, 1975 WH (5), Box 8, Folder France, 
1975 (6) WH, GRFL. 
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States and needed to ward off the opposition of the pro-exports Gaullists to its major policies.  
In addition, the presence of multiple actors within the German nuclear industry (instead one 
or two major firms) made government-to-government bargains less effective from the 
nonproliferation standpoint. In contrast, the state-controlled French nuclear industry (despite 
its discontentment over heightened export control measures) was more susceptible to 
oversight of the Elysee and Quai d’Orsay. The government control over the French nuclear 
industry ensured that the transactional understandings between the Ford administration and 
the Giscard government improved nonproliferation mechanisms in France.83  
 
IV.  West Germany as Nuclear Supplier: The Schmidt-Genscher Front 
West Germany, like France, was also led by a new leader in May 1974. Following Willy 
Brandt’s resignation on 7 May 1974, Helmut Schmidt became the German Chancellor, and 
led the SPD-FDP coalition. His was an export-oriented outlook. Both Chancellor Schmidt 
and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher were in support of expanding German 
nuclear exports worldwide, as were the Ministry of Research and Technolgy (BMFT), and 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs (BMWi). The influence of nonproliferation experts on 
West German export policy was weak.84 Nuclear exports were treated as any other kind of 
exports, and proliferation risks from nuclear transfers to threshold states were not a source of 
serious concern for the Schmidt government. West German firms like Kraftwerk Union had a 
flexible structure such that they did not merely sell turn-key power plants but offered 																																																								
83 Some scholars might argue that these transactional bargains between France and the United States were part 
of general improved bilateral relations and/or the outcome of U.S. secret nuclear assistance to French nuclear 
weapons program beginning in the Nixon years.  However, it cannot be said with absolute certainty that the 
‘negative guidance’ offered by the Americans to French nuclear weapons program as part of the Nixon-era 
secret assistance was indeed for French cooperation in the domain of nuclear nonproliferation. This can only be 
said for a handful of Franco-American agreements after 1974 as those mentioned in this article. For U.S. secret 
nuclear assistance to France during see William Burr, "U.S. Secret Assistance to the French Nuclear Program, 
1969-1975: From "Fourth Country" to Strategic Partner," NPIHP Research Update, Nuclear Proliferation 
International History Project, Washington, DC, July 2011. See also: Richard H. Ullman, "The Covert French 
Connection," Foreign Policy, no. 75 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-33.  
84 Interview conducted by author of West German academic expert on nonproliferation questions during 
Schmidt-Carter era, 4 May 2016. 
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comprehensive sales packages that included technology transfer, financing, training of 
personnel and additional services to recipient states. This made West German firms quite 
desirable to governments in developing countries.85 
 
During the Ford and Carter years, German nuclear assistance to countries in the developing 
world frequently challenged U.S. nonproliferation efforts. During 1975-1979, West German 
pledges of nuclear assistance involved uranium enrichment to Brazil, plutonium reprocessing 
to Iran and Argentina, and heavy water plants and dual-use components to India and 
Pakistan, among others. In other words, German nuclear exports involved both sensitive 
nuclear assistance (enrichment and reprocessing that are direct pathways to nuclear weapons) 
as well as dual-use assistance to ‘sensitive’ countries (states that the United States considered 
to possess or the desire to possess nuclear weapons capability). American officials noted in 
their West German counterparts a stark lack of awareness of proliferation risks from nuclear 
transfers to threshold states, namely, those states closest to developing nuclear weapons. 86 
  
The Ford administration did not find it easy to convince the Germans to agree to a 
moratorium on the sale of reprocessing plants. While the Giscard government in France 
cooperated albeit with domestic challenges, the Schmidt government in Germany was in 
direct opposition. In May 1976, in his conversation with German officials in Bonn, Henry 
Kissinger pitched the idea for a moratorium on the construction of reprocessing plants citing 
French interest: “We are basically against the sale of reprocessing plants. During the 
discussions with Giscard in Washington I got the feeling that he would be prepared to say 
																																																								
85 Erwin Hackel, "International Nuclear Commerce and Nonproliferation: A West German View," in Jones et al, 
eds., The Nuclear Suppliers and Nonproliferation: International Policy Choices (Lexington, MA and Toronto: 
Lexington Books, 1984). 
86 Interview conducted by author of former U.S. policymaker in the Carter administration managing key 
nonproliferation questions, 6 October 2015. 
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that they will not sell (reprocessing plants) any more. That is, they would agree to a 
moratorium for some period of time.” 
West German foreign minister Genscher’s immediate reaction was that such a proposition 
was a “very difficult” one. 87  Kissinger, in response, made a case against binational 
reprocessing plants while also refuting the idea of regional or multinational reprocessing 
plants. He said, “Binational plants don’t help because if they try to kick you out— Brazil, 
Iran— what can you do?” Constructing reprocessing plants was dangerous for international 
stability argued Kissinger and insisted that a moratorium acceptance by France and the FRG 
‘would help.’88 On the West German side, neither Genscher nor Peter Hermes — Assistant 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs and chief negotiator on nuclear export questions— were 
convinced. In their response to Kissinger’s moratorium request, Bonn suggested further 
bilateral discussions but added that West German deals with Iran and Brazil should not be 
affected by such a moratorium, thus defeating their immediate purpose.89 Kissinger was 
aware that the possibility of reaching consensus on the moratorium at the NSG seemed bleak 
as it could generate a confrontation between the suppliers and recipients.  
 
By late June 1976, the West Germans were moving fast on signing their nuclear contract with 
Tehran on plutonium reprocessing, and  had not responded to the U.S. aide memoire on that 
subject matter. West German intransigence worried Kissinger, who along with his advisor 
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, met with the West German Ambassador Berndt von Staden hoping to 
forestall the contract. West Germany had argued after its agreement with Brazil that the 
United States had not stated its opposition in advance of signing the contracts. As a result, 
																																																								
87 Memorandum of Conversation, Bonn, 23 May 1976, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. 
Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany 1976. Secret; Nodis, RG 59, NARA.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Memorandum from Counsellor Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Washington, 28 
May 1976, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 5, 
Germany 1976. Secret; Nodis, RG 59, NARA. 
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with West German cooperation with Iran and the reprocessing moratorium at stake, Kissinger 
wanted to make sure the West Germans did not get the chance to repeat the same reasoning.90 
When Helmut Schmidt met the Shah of Iran in November that year, however, U.S. 
nonproliferation concerns were put on the backburner.91 
 
Over the next months, the West Germans did not show interest in declaring a moratorium 
while the Ford administration became preoccupied with the presidential elections, especially 
given the emphatic criticism of U.S. nonproliferation policy by candidate Jimmy Carter. 
Bonn, however, remained anxious how a French decision to accept a moratorium would 
affect its own policies. Could it be penalized under the Symington Amendment for exporting 
reprocessing facilities? How would the new U.S. administration of Carter reconcile its 
nonproliferation policy with the FRG’s commercial interest in exporting nuclear reactors and 
fuel cycle facilities? After the French declaration of moratorium on future exports of 
reprocessing in December 1976, some high ranking officials in Bonn wondered if that were at 
all relevant: given Carter’s proactive policy against plutonium and commercial reprocessing, 
it was clear that U.S. objections would make any future sale impossible. It would be not until 
June 1977 that West Germany would adopt a moratorium on future exports of reprocessing 
plants. The 1978 NNPA brought the U.S.-FRG tensions to the fore, as a high-ranking 
personnel at the Indian embassy in Berlin put it: 
The West Germans see in the act a new threat to deals concluded independently by 
West German companies with third countries for the export of nuclear technology 
(Brazil is the classic example). The perception of the American move, as one placing 
obstacles in the development and exportation of nuclear technologies by other 
countries, was made more serious by a number of factors, including the lucrative 
nuclear market, an area where the FRG was well advanced and where a sudden 
shortage has developed in new orders being received for reactors by West Germany’s 																																																								
90 Memorandum of Conversation of the Secretary’s Meeting with FRG Ambassdor von Staden, Washington, 2 
July 1976, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 5, 
Germany 1976. Secret; Nodis, RG 59, NARA. 
91 Hilfrich, “Roots of Animosity,” p. 285. 
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nuclear industry.92 
 
West Germany-India Agreement: Heavy Water Plant Items 
After its nuclear test, as Canadian nuclear assistance to the Indian Atomic Energy 
Commission (IAEC) was becoming increasingly uncertain, India sought out more willing 
suppliers like West Germany. In September 1974, Homi Sethna, the chairman of the Indian 
Atomic Energy Commission, arrived in Bonn after IAEA meetings in Vienna. During his 
trip, he visited the Nuclear Research Center in Karlsruhe and held bilateral discussions on 
nuclear cooperation between Bonn and New Delhi.93 The West Germans had agreed in 1972 
to supply a heavy water plant to India to be built in Talcher. 94 It was not the first instance of 
West German nuclear assistance to India. Bonn had supplied India with its first heavy water 
plant in Nangal in the early 1960s. In the wake of India’s PNE, Washington preferred that 
safeguards be sought on the Talcher heavy water plant. West Germany, however, informed 
that it could not oblige since the export permission had been granted over two years earlier, 
and Bonn could not seek new conditions retroactively.95 In addition, Randermann, chief of 
the foreign office of the West German Atomic Energy Office feared that the federal 
government could be held liable by the West German firm for financial damages incurring 
from new restrictions. Moreover, Randermann argued that heavy water plants were not part 
of the ‘trigger list’, and were restricted under neither IAEA regulations nor the NPT. In the 
absence of legal obstacles, not much could be done to prevent the West German sale of heavy 
																																																								
92 Annual Political Report for 1978, No. BON/POL/101/1/78, Secret, Prepared by Second Secretary (Political) 
D.J.Bell, 15 January 1979, Folder: Annual reports, etc. for the year 1978 from the Embassy of India, 
Bonn (FRG), Berlin (FRG), Research and Intelligence Section (Historical Division), MEA, HI/1011/18/79, 
NAI. 
93 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, 25 September 1974, 1974STATE15167, RG 
59, NARA.  
94 India also received West German nuclear assistance for construction of the first heavy water plant in Nangal 
in northern India that began operation in 1962.  
95 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, 22 October 1974, 1974STATE16577, RG59, 
NARA.  
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water plant to India. By 1975, West German firms also started negotiating to supply  a heavy 
water plant for Pakistan much to the anguish of the Ford administration.96 
 
A second case concerning heavy water plants caught attention of the U.S. embassy in Bonn, 
which gave impetus at the NSG to seek supplier consensus on industrial spare parts and dual-
use items exported to ‘sensitive’ countries. After 1974 India’s nuclear test, both Canada and 
the United States refused to grant export licenses for the same type of compressors owing to 
India’s opposition to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards, and refusal to provide assurances 
that the items would not be used in future nuclear explosions. Consequently, New Delhi 
found a willing supplier in West German firm, Borsig AG. Borsig was a compressor licensee 
of Allis-Chalmers— the Canadian firm that failed to get export licenses for the compressors 
for India from both Ottawa and Washington in the wake of the Indian nuclear test.97 In July 
1975, the West German government granted export approval to Borsig for the supply of 
centrifugal compressors for Indian heavy water plant in Kota, where two CANDU-type 
reactors were being built with Canadian assistance.98 There was some debate within the 
German government about this export to India but because it involved only conventional 
compressors, and neither a plant-specific technology nor a ‘critical component’, the license 
was granted.99 The West German firm had not sought safeguards, and refused to request them 
fearing commercial losses from possible Indian abrogation of the agreement.  
 
																																																								
96 Secret telegram 040475 from State Department to US embassy in Islamabad, February 1976, EXDIS, GFRL.  
97 Secret telegram from State Department to US embassy in Bonn, September 1975, 1975STATE220753, RG 
59, NARA. 
98 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, September 1975, 1975BONN15439, RG59, 
NARA. See also Individual Atomic Law License Cases- KWU, FU, BAM, BORSIG, 1976-1978, Record Group 
84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the US State Department, US Mission Berlin, NARA. 
99 Centrifugal compressors are industrial items that are not only used for nuclear weapons development. Nor are 
they solely used in heavy water plants. They are a kind of turbomachinery that have a wide range of uses in air 
compression, gas drilling, pipeline compression and other civilian-use spheres. 
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West German-Indian nuclear cooperation transpired almost concurrently with the West 
German-Brazil agreement. The latter attracted more public attention because of nature of 
technology being transferred to Brasilia as well as the overt defense of the agreement by the 
Schmidt government on commercial grounds. In June 1975, Brazil was not a signatory to the 
NPT when West Germany and Brazil signed an agreement hailed as the ‘deal of the century,’ 
under which West German firm Kraftwerk Union pledged to supply Brazil with at least eight 
nuclear reactors and full nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The Ford administration raised concerns 
regarding proliferation ambitions of Brazil’s military junta, and a trilateral safeguards 
agreement was signed by West Germany, Brazil and the IAEA. The Carter administration 
engaged in several rounds of high-level meetings with West German officials in an effort to 
terminate the agreement. 100   The Schmidt government publicly defended its nuclear 
agreement with Brazil: it was after all the single largest West German export order to date 
with a value of 10-12 billion marks.101 The ‘deal of the century’, thus, became a bone of 
contention between Washington and Bonn that played out publicly souring U.S.-FRG 
relations during the Carter years. Unlike the West German-Brazil deal, Bonn had a less 
powerful defense for its nuclear assistance to India. India, after all, had used civilian nuclear 
technology obtained through foreign assistance to conduct a nuclear explosion. However, the 
West German government tried to protect the export rights of its firms, and its commercial 
interests. So while there was no overt defiance of U.S. nonproliferation efforts as in the case 
of Brazil, Bonn was quiet as it tried to carry on with its exports to New Delhi as if it were 
‘business as usual’. More importantly, the assistance to India was of dual-use character and 
harder to control through existing legal mechanisms.  
 																																																								
100 Secret Memorandum, Foreign Minister Azerado da Silveira, Information for the President of Brazil, ‘Nuclear 
Issues. Meeting at 13/02/78. Alvadora Palace.’ 13 February 1978, Wilson Center Digital Archive document ID 
116877, Acquired by CPDOC Archives, AAS mre d 1974.03.26 pp.12361-12366. Obtained and translated by 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas. 
101 Gray, “Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties,” p. 450; Hilfrich, "Roots of Animosity,” p. 279. 
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The West German-Indian nuclear cooperation brought to light two key issues. First, dual-use 
facilities like heavy water plants and their components were still getting away despite posing 
proliferation risks owing to the recipient’s intent (Pakistan) or past actions (India). Second, 
the London Suppliers Conference needed to arrive at consensus on such facilities to make 
sure no supplier got a commercial advantage as had happened with Borsig that stepped in 
where Canadian firm Allis-Chalmers left. However, the dual-use issue was not affecting 
West German nuclear assistance alone. A similar situation arose in the United States in 
December 1974 with respect to a Union Carbide contract to supply unsafeguarded trays for a 
heavy water plant in India. 102 While Kissinger approved the export in January 1975 stating 
that each nuclear export to India should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, heavy water 
plant components became the subject of serious inquiry in the Ford administration.103 It was 
noted that although heavy water was itself a sensitive item that required IAEA safeguards, 
heavy water plants and their components were not incorporated into the Zangger 
Committee’s trigger list at the time.  
 
West German firm Borsig AG was headquartered in West Berlin, and needed export 
authorization from the Allied Kommandatura— the Allied governing body of the divided city 
of Berlin. Kissinger saw opportunity to influence the FRG through drawing the British and 
French into it. Both London and Paris supported the US position to oppose Borsig’s sale of 
compressors for the Indian heavy water plant.104 Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco 
instructed U.S. ambassador Martin Hillenbrand to request the Kommandatura’s economics 																																																								
102 US State Department Action Memorandum for US Secretary of State from Alfred L. Atherton Jr. and Samuel 
Lewis entitled, “Nuclear Export Policy Toward India,” 26 December 1974, Record Group 59. Records of the 
Department of State. Records of the Policy, Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, Box 
368 folder: Sensitive Non-China Chron 1975; Acquired by William Burr and shared by Burr with this author. 
103 US State Department Briefing Memorandum for US Secretary of State from Winston Lord entitled, “Export 
of Trays to India,” 13 January 1975, RG 59. Records of the Department of State. Records of the Policy, 
Planning Staff, Director's Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, Box 368 folder: Sensitive Non-China Chron 1975; 
Acquired by William Burr shared by Burr with this author. 
104 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, December 1975, 1975BONN20807, RG 59, 
NARA. 
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committee to postpone its decision on the Borsig’s export license application in order to 
study its full implications. Sisco advised discretion since any press report could lead to 
questioning of “allied commitment to West Berlin’s economic viability.”105 In a meeting with 
Hillenbrand in December 1975, Werner Rouget, in charge of nuclear affairs at the FRG 
foreign ministry also emphasized the need for secrecy since it involved West Berlin. 106 
Moreover, Rouget was concerned that any German interference on U.S. advice could lead to 
a lawsuit from Borsig. He himself was in favor of a ‘compromise’ solution, in agreement 
with Washington, whereby Bonn sought safeguards and assurances from New Delhi for a no 
nuclear explosives-related end-use. Finally, Rouget conveyed that the West German 
government would like export control measures for compressors to be discussed at the 
upcoming NSG meetings for future transactions, irrespective of the outcome of the Borsig 
case. In addition, there was interdepartmental disagreement within the West German federal 
government on export licenses for Borsig. The technical ministry (BMFT) and the economics 
ministry (BMWi) gathered data to argue that compressors were conventional items and not 
critical, thereby not requiring safeguards. The BMWi was the main authority for export 
licenses. Anxious of industrial backlash, BMWi in particular did not wish to reverse its 
original decision of license approval for the Borsig deal with India. At the West German 
foreign ministry, Rouget shared U.S. nonproliferation concerns especially in the light of 
Canadian and US refusal to grant licenses for the same compressors for India. However, his 
main concern was the tough stance of BMFT and BMWi, and of a possible lawsuit by Borsig 
against the West German government.107  
 
																																																								
105 Secret telegram from State Department to US embassy in Bonn, September 1975, 1975STATE220753, RG 
59, NARA. 
106 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, December 1975, 1975BONN20877, RG 59, 
NARA. 
107 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, December 1975, 1975BONN20633, RG 59, 
NARA. 
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By May 1976, the FRG informed the United States that it would prefer to deal with the 
Borsig case in Bonn and not through the Allied Kommandatura in West Berlin.108 Rouget 
informed Hillenbrand that the firm had been informed that export license would not be 
granted, and the case was ‘sleeping.’109 With Carter’s presidential campaign in full steam, the 
West Germans were anxious to find out what the new administration’s policy would be 
towards their own nuclear industry.  
 
By January 1977, the West German government undertook an important step. It decided to 
amend the atomic energy list of its Federal Trade and Payments Act (AWG) to include heavy 
water plant compressors that would be “identified by a combination of technical and ‘end-
use’ criteria.”110 This ensured that the existing export control regulations of the Allied 
Kommandatura, federal German government the NSG guidelines and the trigger list were all 
in line with requiring safeguards for heavy water plants and components used in such plants. 
Borsig was subsequently informed that the West German government would apply the 
amendment to the Act retroactively causing ‘rumors’ that the company planned to send its 
shipment to India before the amendment took effect.111 An alternative option that Bonn 
offered to New Delhi was that India provide assurance that no material produced in a reactor 
using heavy water from the plant that had Borsig compressors would be used in nuclear 
explosives. 112  Not surprisingly, India rejected that condition. The Bonn government 
continued to be under pressure from the West German industry to allow the sale of 																																																								
108 Washington, however, secretly kept a licensing refusal via the Allied Kommandatura as the last option (i.e. if 
Germany did not cooperate) but was unwilling to use it fearing media backlash from perceived economic losses 
incurred by West Berlin for Allied controls. Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, 
January 1977, 1976BONN01572, RG 59, NARA. 
109 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, May 1976, 1976BONN12368, RG 59, 
NARA. 
110 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, January 1977, 1977BONN01572, RG 59, 
NARA. 
111 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, February 1977, 1977BONN02103, RG 59, 
NARA. 
112 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, February 1977, 1977BONN02997, RG 59, 
NARA. 
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compressors to India. Rouget informed the U.S. embassy in Bonn that the FRG was 
considering the possibility of manufacturing the compressors through Borsig, Germany 
instead of Borsig, Berlin to avoid an allied veto through the Kommandatura.113  
 
In June 1977, Bonn declared a moratorium on commercial sale of reprocessing technology. 
This moratorium, six months after the similar French decision, quietly killed West German 
reprocessing contract with Iran. The Schmidt government, however, were adamant to keep its 
contract with Brazil unaffected by its moratorium decision. In other words, Bonn was 
warding off U.S. nonproliferation pressures to curtail its nuclear assistance to multiple 
countries. India was not the only one. However, India was a country that the United States 
was also a supplier to. Rouget was therefore curious how President Carter’s January 1978 
visit to India went, and if Washington was able to find a solution regarding its own shipment 
of fuel for India’s Tarapur reactors.114 The Carter administration had hoped that with the new 
government of Morarji Desai in power, New Delhi might yield to U.S. request for full-scope 
IAEA safeguards on the U.S.-supplied Tarapur reactors. Those hopes did not translate into 
actual policy change in New Delhi but President Carter decided to make multiple exemptions 
allowing U.S. fuel shipment to India raising concerns in Bonn of U.S. double standards.  
 
Almost a year later, in May 1978, the West German foreign ministry notified the U.S. 
embassy that the Borsig deal was dead.115 The four-year struggle to prevent the sale of 
unsafeguarded compressors for an Indian heavy water plant thus drew to an end. It seemed 
that the U.S. persistence bore fruit, and Bonn followed U.S. advice albeit grudgingly to 
prevent the sale without adequate safeguards and assurances from India. This vindication 																																																								
113 Ibid. 
114 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, January 1978, 1978BONN00521, RG 59, 
NARA. 
115 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, May 1978, 1978BONN09790, RG 59, 
NARA. 
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was, however, short lived. The U.S. embassy in Bonn informed the Carter administration that 
the Indians had informed West German officials that Bonn’s cancellation of the Borsig deal 
was not a “major problem.”116 Further inquiry revealed that New Delhi had already shelved 
plans for those compressors in 1976, and had focused on indigenous production of the items 
instead. There was additional information that East European, notably East German technical 
assistance was probably being used by the IAEC for manufacturing the heavy water plant 
compressors for Kota. The compressors for the Talcher heavy water plant that was provided 
by a Czechoslovak company.117 It is not clear whether Borsig or any of its subsidiaries were 
involved in this deal but such possibilities could not be completely ruled out given the inter-
German trade relations and economic cooperation as a consequence of Ostpolitik.118 If Borsig 
was indeed involved, then the acquiescence of some members within the West German 
government, particularly technical and economic ministries, is one possibility. A second 
possibility is that it was undertaken primarily at the level of firms through inter-German firm 
coordination, i.e. Borsig in West Berlin transacting with similar East German firms. The 
Indian contacts of the U.S. embassy that furnished the information remarked that the Czechs 
could have received the technology from another East European supplier. Both 
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became NSG members in 
1976-77 while the Borsig episode was in full swing, and their bilateral relations with India 
were more than cordial at the time.  
 
The 1974 annual report from the Indian embassy in Prague noted, “Relations with India had 
reached an all-time high with the exchange of visits by Smt. Gandhi to the Czechoslovakia in 																																																								
116 Secret telegram from US embassy in Bonn to State Department, September 1, 1978, 1978BONN15994, RG 
59, NARA. 
117 Secret telegram from State Department to US embassy in Berlin, September 22, 1978, 1978STATE242694, 
RG 59, NARA. 
118 On Helmut Schmidt’s management of the policy of Ostpolitik after Willy Brandt, see Chapter 1 in Stephan 
Kieninger, The Diplomacy of Détente: Cooperative Security Policies from Helmut Schmidt to George Shultz 
(London: Routledge, 2018), Forthcoming. 
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1972 and Dr. Gustav Husak to India in December 1973,” adding that on the “Rajasthan 
nuclear implosion there has been a discreet silence.”119 The India-East German relationship 
was also on an upswing: a bilateral trade protocol was signed in 1975 providing for a 
turnover of Rs. 110 crores in 1976 (100 crores is 1 billion), which was a 10% increase from 
the figure of 1975, involving non-traditional goods, comprising mostly engineering items.120 
Friendly relations between New Delhi and Eastern bloc countries, like the Czech Republic 
and the GDR, were a product of the Indo-Soviet partnership of the 1970s. Since the 1971 
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, political and economic ties 
between Moscow and New Delhi had only expanded. India’s Bhillai steel plant, built with 
Soviet assistance, was producing 25 million tons of steel by 1976, and the Soviet military was 
helping with the modernization of the Indian naval fleet. 121  Soviet response to India’s 1974 
nuclear test was silenceSoviet technical assistance to India’s nuclear program witnessed an 
upswing in the wake of the test, particularly, by 1976. 122  After the termination of Canadian 
nuclear assistance in May that year, the Soviet Union agreed to supply 200 tonnes of heavy 
water to India to make up for Canada’s withdrawal.123  This was not the first instance of 
Soviet heavy water supply: in 1972, Moscow had also provided to New Delhi 80 tonnes of 
																																																								
119 Annual reports from Prague - 1974, Research and Intelligence Section (Historical Division), Annual Political 
Apercu for 1974, No. PRA/POL/101/2/75, Secret, Prepared by Amb. V. Siddharthacharry, 14 Jan 1975, 
HI/1011(25)/75, MEA, NAI. 
120 Annual Political Report for 1975, No. GDR/101/1/75, Secret, Prepared by Ambassador A.R. Deo, 27 January 
1976, Folder: Annual reports from Berlin (GDR) for the year 1975, Research and Intelligence Section 
(Historical Division),  HI/1011(100)/76, MEA, NAI.  
121 Telegram from Ambassador Jean-Claude Winckler, French embassy in New Delhi to French Foreign 
Ministry (No. 1027/29), Objet : Inde-URSS, 11 December 1976, Carton 206INVA, Direction Asie-Oceanie, 
Inde 2253, 1973-1980, Archives Diplomatiques Françaises, La Courneuve, France, (hereafter, ADF). 
122 Balazs Szalontai, “The Elephant in the Room: The Soviet Union and India’s Nuclear Program, 1967-1989, 
NPIHP Working Paper #1, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Washington, DC, November 
2011. 
123 “Soviet to Sell India Heavy Water for Use In Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, 9 December 1976. 
See also: Yogesh Joshi, “Between Principles and Pragmatism: India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 
in the Post-PNE Era, 1974–1980,” The International History Review (2018), early view/online first. 
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heavy water.124 In other words, the Soviet Union’s involvement in finding an East European 
solution to India’s woes vis-à-vis the Borsig deal is a third possibility.  
 
Notwithstanding the inter-German camaraderie during Ostpolitik, the GDR had an 
ideological quibble with the FRG and the West, broadly speaking. This quibble was based on 
GDR’s standpoint that West Berlin was not “a consistent part of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and will continue not to be governed by it.”125 An Indian diplomat noted that 
despite Soviet advice, “GDR had made its point, namely, that it is as much an indirect party 
to the status-quo on Berlin as the Four Powers are to the agreement on West Berlin”126 East 
Germany’s ideological standpoint and West Berlin’s unique legal character in the Cold War 
had consequences for nuclear nonproliferation efforts during the latter half of the 1970s.  
 
First, the question arose in spring 1976, soon after Borsig applied for export licenses at the 
Allied Kommandatura to export five turbocompressors for Indian heavy water plant in Kota, 
whether Berlin was at all subject to the NSG guidelines. Since Borsig was headquartered in 
the French zone of West Berlin, the French standpoint was because both the governments of 
France and West Germany were participating in the NSG meetings in London, the NSG 
guidelines applied to Berlin. 127 The French joined the chorus with the Americans that 
without adequate IAEA safeguards on the exports, and assurances from the Indian 
																																																								
124 Telegram from Ambassador Jean-Claude Winckler, French embassy in New Delhi to French Foreign 
Ministry (No. 1027/29), Objet : Inde-URSS, 11 December 1976, Carton 206INVA, Direction Asie-Oceanie, 
Inde 2253, 1973-1980, ADF. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Annual Political Report for 1974, No. GDR/101/2/74, Secret, Prepared by Ambassador A.R. Deo, 31 January 
1975, Folder: Annual reports from Berlin (GDR) - 1974, Research and Intelligence Section (Historical 
Division), HI/1011(100)/75, MEA, NAI.  
127 Top Secret telegram from O. Wormser at the French embassy in Bonn to the ‘directeurs’ at the French 
Foreign Ministry in Paris (No. 1197/1202), Diffussion strictement reservée, Objet : Non prolifération, 
exportation de compresseurs par Borsig (Berlin), 21 April 1976, Carton 206INVA, Direction Asie-Oceanie, 
Inde 2253, 1973-1980, ADF.  
Sarkar 2018 
JCWS 
 
 
42 
government that the exports of equipment by Borsig would not be used in future nuclear 
explosions, the deal must not go through.  
 
Second, American U.S. policymakers restrained themselves from overtly calling out Borsig 
because of the sensitivities surrounding Berlin, i.e. letting Berliners manage their own affairs. 
There were concerns on the American side that public criticism could lead to an outcry that 
the Western occupying powers were standing in the way of economic development of Berlin 
in the name of nonproliferation. As a result, the United States involved Canada to also 
canvass against the Borsig deal.128 The rationale was that the participation of Canada would 
help sanitize U.S. nonproliferation efforts from the Cold War angle, namely, Western 
occupation of West Berlin. It would signal to Bonn that it was not the three occupying 
Western powers— the United States, the United Kingdom and France— that demanded the 
Borsig deal be scrapped but instead four parties that were signatories to the NSG guidelines 
pushed against the deal on nonproliferation grounds. It was also for the sensitivities 
surrounding Berlin that it was decided that Borsig’s export license application would not be 
rejected by the Allied Kommandatura but the firm would be privately discouraged from 
pursuing its contract with India.129 
Despite the ambiguous outcome of the Borsig deal, the West German government amended 
its Federal Trade and Payments Act and harmonized its national regulations in line with the 
NSG guidelines on heavy water plants and related components. The Borsig case itself 
ensured that a timely consensus was reached at the NSG to incorporate heavy water plants 
and its components into the Zangger Committee’s trigger list.  
 																																																								
128 Secret telegram from Paul Henry at the French embassy in Bonn to the ‘French high commission in Berlin 
(No. 1416/1425) and to French Foreign Ministry in Paris (No. 3299/3308), Diffussion strictement reservée, 
Objet : Demande de la firme Borsig pour l’exportation de turbo-compressuers vers l’Inde, 5 November 1976, 
Carton 206INVA, Direction Asie-Oceanie, Inde 2253, 1973-1980, ADF. 
129 Ibid. 
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Inadequate Carrots for Germany  
The quid pro quo bargains or ‘carrots’ for nonproliferation were more frequent in 
U.S.-French cooperation during the Ford administration than in U.S.-German relations. This 
was owing to three factors. First, Germany, unlike France, was already party to the NPT and 
was part of the Zangger Committee. This meant that Bonn was already participating in the 
key nonproliferation and export controls measures existing at the time. The Ford 
administration, therefore, focused its energies on France, and on seeking French participation 
in harmonized nuclear export controls at the NSG. Second, Bonn was dependent on 
American military and nuclear security guarantees, which was not the case with France that 
had control over its own nuclear weapons, and after 1966 had withdrawn its forces from 
NATO’s integrated command structure. France was a recalcitrant ally with an independent 
nuclear doctrine that had to be negotiated with care. German strategic dependence on the 
United States dwarfed any U.S. need for tit-for-tat bargaining, instead. Third and finally, the 
German laissez-faire policy contributed to a nuclear industry that had multiple independent 
firms that shared close ties with the economics and technical ministries of the federal 
government. This made the issue of tackling German nuclear exports a hydra-headed 
challenge. The state-controlled and heavily subsidized French nuclear industry was, 
therefore, easier to access through striking appropriate quid pro quo bargains with the 
Giscard government.  
 
As a result, U.S. efforts toward Germany to convince it to adopt strict nonproliferation 
standards were through, (a) creating legal obstacles for exports (for instance, involving the 
Allied Kommandatura in the Borsig case), (b) raising opposition by Bonn’s European 
partners— France, Britain and the Netherlands— to create pressure to act (for instance, 
Giscard’s tightening of nonproliferation controls, and British and Dutch opposition to allow 
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URENCO’s centrifige technology from being transferred to Brazil), and (c) the 
multilateralism of the Nuclear Suppliers Group during the Ford years and the INFCE of the 
Carter era. Unlike the French case, when most nonproliferation gains were attained through 
bilateral quid pro quo, very little was accomplished on nonproliferation between Washington 
and Bonn at the bilateral level. During the Ford years, Kissinger expressed his 
discontentment privately to the German government. Under the Carter administration, the 
disagreements were made public, which only strained U.S.-German relations.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
The study shows that both Ford and Carter administrations were keen on tackling 
nonproliferation but despite their best efforts, success was only partial. Although the French 
contract with Pakistan was terminated, it is believed that the French company SGN 
transferred blueprints of the reprocessing plant to Pakistan.130 West German company KWU 
had also decided to pass on blueprints to Brazil of reactors and reprocessing facilities in 
1977, which German Foreign Minister Genscher defended to President Carter as not relevant 
to proliferation concerns.131 Despite a four-year long effort to stop dual-use transfers to New 
Delhi, India was able to procure necessary components from Czech and East German firms. 
In other words, the proliferation risks largely remained notwithstanding the efforts of the 
Ford and Carter administrations. The formation of the NSG, the reprocessing moratorium, the 
Glenn and Symington amendments, the INFCE and the NNPA comprise the U.S. 
nonproliferation milestones of the time. However, despite its vast efforts, the United States 
was compelled to play whack-a-mole as multiple suppliers in a crowded nuclear marketplace 																																																								
130 Feroz Hassan Khan. Eating Grass, p. 132. This claim is also made by a former French foreign ministry 
official, who went so far as to say that because Pakistan could not successfully build the reprocessing plant even 
when eqipped with sensitive blueprints, it showed that the France-Pakistan cooperation posed little proliferation 
risks. Source: Letter from top-ranking French official in charge of scientific and technical questions at Quai 
d’Orsay, Document furnished by Florent Pouponneau to this author in June 2017. 
131 It is not known if Brazil’s parallel nuclear weapons program launched in 1978 used the blueprints shared by 
West Germany. See: Gray, "Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties,” p. 462, 465. 
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offered technology and materials to sensitive states. Policy coordination on export controls 
with its advanced industrialized allies proved to be a difficult process, and legal loopholes 
were aplenty, especially, in the case of dual-use items.  
  
 The study also underscores the divergent trajectories of France and Germany on 
nonproliferation since the latter half of the 1970s. While the Giscard government cooperated 
early with the United States during the Ford administration, the Schmidt government opposed 
U.S. nonproliferation efforts as an assault on German national sovereignty and its 
commercial right to export. Moreover, France was at a technologically superior position than 
Germany : First, it had the independent mastery of the full fuel cycle, and did not depend on 
authorization of the URENCO or any multilateral body to export reprocessing technology. 
Second, France had high domestic demand for nuclear energy unlike Germany, which 
depended more on exports and had an anti-nuclear movement at home to contend with. This 
created for Bonn multilateral disadvantages to nuclear exports like the URENCO, on the one 
hand, and made it more desperate to export nuclear technology and materials to whoever was 
willing to buy, on the other. This technological superiority allowed France to reduce 
commercial losses from nonproliferation-related policy changes in ways that was impossible 
for Germany: France was able to offer reprocessing services to clients instead of exporting 
proliferation risk-prone reprocessing plants. 
 
Finally, the pro-export lobby in France never completely disappeared. Worried by U.S. 
nonproliferation policies, the CEA made large investments in R&D for devising technology 
and materials that were less proliferation-prone. An example was the Caramel fuel that was 
expected to be used in the Osirak reactor in Iraq instead of the highly enriched uranium 
Sarkar 2018 
JCWS 
 
 
46 
fuel. 132  By the 1980s, France developed the CHEMEX (uranium chemical exchange 
enrichment process) and AVLIS (atomic vapor laser isotope separation) technniques for 
uranium enrichment that were expected to pose lower proliferation risks.133  The early 
cooperation with the United States on nonproliferation paid off for France by the latter part of 
the Carter period. The 1978 NNPA complicated U.S. supply commitments to multiple 
sensitive countries, like India and South Africa. France emerged as the ‘non-U.S., non-
Soviet’ solution to U.S. supply woes. The Reagan administration would take this partnership 
forward by making France the supplier that kept U.S. supply commitments where the United 
States itself could not owing to domestic legislations. German firms would continue to  
exploit legal loopholes by providing dual-use assistance to sensitive states like Iraq, South 
Africa, and others. It would be not until the 1991 Gulf War, however, that the world would 
know of German firms’ involvement in the Iraqi WMD program.  Not only would it lead to a 
complete overhaul of German nuclear export control legislations134 but also provide the 
window of opportunity to generate consensus among supplier states to adopt the Dual-Use 
Guidelines of the NSG in 1992, offcially known as the INFCIRC254/Part II.135 
																																																								
132 On the Osirak reactor see: Shai Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq - Revisited," International Security, Vol. 
7, No. 2 (1982), pp. 114-142; Malfrid-Braut Hegghammer, "Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear 
Proliferation Risks," International Security Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), pp. 101-132. 
133 Science and Weapons Daily Review, 9 August 1984, Top Secret, Director of Intelligence. CREST, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000680140.pdf, last accessed 21 January 2018. 
134 The INFCIRC254/Part I is the set of official NSG guidelines that were published by the IAEA in 1978. 
These 1978 guidelines complemented the original guidelines that were decided by consensus by the member 
nations in 1976.  
135 On German export controls overhaul see: Harald Müller et al, "From Black Sheep to White Angel? The New 
German Export Controls Policy," PRIF Reports No. 32 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, January 
1994). 
